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A Harvest of Shame:
The Imposition of Independent Contractor
Status on Migrant Farmworkers and Its
Ramifications for Migrant Children
by
JEANNE M. GLADER
Alejandra Sanchez stands in the hot sun, swipes at a wisp of hair
with her plastic-gloved hand and grabs the handle of a bucket filled
with cucumbers. The eleven-year-old girl is accuitomed to spending
her summer vacations picking cucumbers with her parents and those
of her thirteen brothers and sisters old enough to work. Her eight-year-
old brother, Fidel, first pulled on the plastic gloves that protect a pick-
er's hands from the prickly cucumber skin last summer.
The Sanchez children's child labor is legal under the employment
contract their sharecropper father, Pedro, signed with the grower. The
contract says Sanchez is a "share farmer"-an independent contractor
running his own business. Children under state and federal law are
allowed to work in family businesses, except when school is in session.'
A continuing development in agricultural labor is the trend among
major growers to classify migrant farmworkers as "independent con-
tractors" rather than "employees." How these farmworkers are clas-
sified determines what protections they are afforded from sub-standard
working conditions. Independent contractor status arises from "share-
farming" (or sharecropping) agreements. 2 Under a typical sharefarm-
ing agreement, the grower or landowner generally agrees to "furnish
and prepare the land; plant the crop; cultivate, spray, and fertilize the
crop; and pay all the costs incurred with respect thereto." ' 3 In return,
the "sharefarmer" agrees "to furnish the labor necessary to care for
the land and plants during the growing season, to harvest the ...
crop, and to sort, grade and pack the [crop] for marketing by [the
1. Echenique, Businessman or Farmworker?, CAL. LAw., Dec. 1988, 32, 32.
2. The terms "sharefarming" and "sharecropping" are synonyms and are used inter-
changeably.
3. S.G. Borello & Sons v. Dep't of Indus. Relations, 48 Cal. 3d 341, 346, 769 P.2d 399,
401, 256 Cal. Rptr. 543, 545 (1989).
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grower]." 4 After the crop is sold,' the grower and sharefarmer equally
split the gross proceeds of the harvest.6
By classifying workers in sharefarming arrangements as inde-
pendent contractors, agricultural employers are able to avoid the ex-
pense and inconvenience of complying with worker protection
provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA),7 including health
and safety standards, unemployment and disability insurance, and,
perhaps most importantly, protections against oppressive child labor."
The relevant regulation defines "oppressive child labor" as "a con-
dition of employment under which (1) any employee under the age of
sixteen years is employed . . . in any occupation [except for children
employed by a parent in a non-hazardous occupation] or (2) any em-
ployee between the ages of sixteen and eighteen years is employed by
an employer in any occupation which the Secretary of Labor shall find
and by order declare to be particularly hazardous for the employment
of children between such ages or detrimental to their health or well-
being . . . . "9 Since farmworkers classified as "independent contrac-
tors" do not fall within the FLSA definition of "employee," growers
are not required to provide such workers with any of the protections
the Act affords.'0
This Note analyzes the significance of the distinction between in-
dependent contractor and employee status for the migrant agricultural
worker, focusing on the importance of this distinction to any attempt
at eliminating child labor abuses from agriculture.
4. Real v. Driscoll Strawberry Assocs., 603 F.2d 748, 751 (9th Cir. 1979) (footnote
omitted).
5. See, e.g., Borello, 48 Cal. 3d at 347, 769 P.2d at 403, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 547 (cucumber
contract between grower and Vlasic pickle company).
6. See, e.g., id. at 346, 769 P.2d at 401, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 545.
7. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988).
8. 29 U.S.C. § 212(c) (1988).
9. 29 U.S.C. § 203(1) (1988); see 29 C.F.R. § 570.1(b) (1990). See infra note 55 for the
full definition of oppressive child labor.
10. The legislative history of the FLSA indicates that Congress intended to protect only
employees under the Act, and not independent contractors:
It is intended that the minimum wage provisions of the Act be extended to certain
sharecroppers and tenant farmers. The test of coverage for these persons will be the
same test that is applied to determine whether any other person is an employee or
not. Employer, employee, and employ, are all defined terms in the Act. Coverage
is intended in the case of certain so-called sharecroppers or tenants whose work
activities are closely guided by the landowner or his agent. These individuals, called
sharecroppers and tenants, are employees by another name. Their work is closely
directed; discretion is nonexistent. True independent-contractor sharecroppers or
tenant farmers will not be covered; they are not employees.
H.R. REP. No. 1366, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1966).
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Part I introduces the continuing plight of the migrant farmworker
in the United States, especially the situation of the child worker. Part
II begins with a brief history of the Fair Labor Standards Act and
its child labor provisions. Particular emphasis is given to the Act's
failure to address adequately the needs of migrant workers. Part II
also explains the current inequity of the "family farm" exemption,
which expressly excludes children from the Act's protective provisions
when the child's "employer" is a parent."1 Lastly, this Part explains
the various reasons growers find the independent contractor desig-
nation so appealing. Part III analyzes the importance of employee
rather than independent contractor status in light of recent devel-
opments in California agricultural labor law and the effect of the joint
employer doctrine.' 2 Part IV exposes the defects inherent in case-by-
case determination of the employment status of migrant workers and
their children. Part V underscores the importance of ending child labor
abuses in agriculture by revising laws that presently allow employers
to avoid FLSA requirements by designating migrant workers as in-
dependent contractors. Finally, Part VI proposes three remedies for
the inadequacies of existing case law regarding employee status under
the FLSA: (1) the abolition of the "family farm" exemption under
the Act; (2) proposed legislation designating migrant workers and their
children as employees per se; and (3) increased enforcement, meaning
more zealous investigation and prosecution of violators, of the child
labor provisions of the FLSA.
I. Introduction: Migrant Farmworkers in America
According to Edward R. Roybal, Chairman of the House Select
Committee on Aging, "There are no standards or standard Federal
definitions for migrant and seasonal farmworkers. Generally, the term
refers to people whose main source of income depends on hand labor,
farm work which either takes them away from their home or depends
on seasonal crops.' 13
Although statistics about migrant farm laborers are difficult to
compile because of the temporary nature of their working and living
11. See infra note 62.
12. The joint employer doctrine posits that the "statutory definition of 'employer' can
encompass two or more individuals with respect to the same employee." Maldonado v. Lucca,
629 F. Supp. 483, 487 (D.N.J. 1986).
13. After 30 Years, America's Continuing Harvest of Shame: Hearing Before the House
Select Comm. on Aging, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1990) (statement of Edward Roybal,
Chairman, House Select Comm. on Aging) [hereinafter Harvest of Shame Hearing].
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conditions, it is believed that at least seventy percent of the migrant
work force currently in the United States is Hispanic-Mexican-Amer-
icans, Mexican nationals, Puerto Ricans, and Central Americans. 4
Blacks and whites comprise about fifteen percent and ten percent of
the migrant work force, respectively. 5
George L. Ortiz, President of the California Human Development
Corporation, testified before the House Select Committee on Aging
that the national farmworker population is currently estimated to be
approximately six million people. 16 Of those six million, approximately
two-thirds, or four million, are either elderly or minor dependents;
"[w]ithin that subpopulation of dependents, fewer than ten percent
of the school-age children are enrolled in migrant education pro-
grams."17
The migrant farmworker is among the most oppressed of all
American workers. Pesticide poisoning is estimated to kill as many
as one thousand agricultural workers annually, and results in ap-
proximately ninety thousand injuries annually. 8 Tuberculosis, flu,
pneumonia, intestinal parasites, and other preventable diseases occur
at a rate 200 to 500 percent higher among migrant farm families than
the general population. 9 The average life expectancy of the migrant
worker is only forty-nine years. 20 Because farm work is extremely haz-
ardous, the risk of injury is very high.
The disability rate for migratory or seasonal farmworkers is three
times that of the general population. Falls from ladders in apple and
citrus orchards are common, as are accidents with loaders and other
field equipment. Migrants work at a feverish pace because they usu-
ally are paid by the amount they pick. They are always fighting fa-
tigue as the workday progresses, particularly the children, and their
thoughts are not on safety but on filling buckets and bins. 2'
In addition, migrant farmworkers are among the poorest paid workers
in America. In 1983, the average migrant farm family's income was
only about $6,000 a year. 22
Migrant workers are unable to fight for or protect their legal rights
because of inadequate access to legal services. "One report to the United
States Civil Rights Commission noted that 'migrants, perhaps more
14. B. ASHABRANNER, DARK HARVEST 22 (1985).
15. Id.
16. Harvest of Shame Hearing, supra note 13, at 14.
17. Id.
18. B. ASHABRANNER, supra note 14, at 44.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. McConahay, Despite Obstacles, Farmworkers Still Dream for Their Children, L.A.
Daily J., Oct. 28, 1983, at 14, col. 4.
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than any other group, have historically been confronted with the great-
est need for, but the least access to, legal services."'
This oppression is most striking in the migrant child. As noted
by Senators Jacob Javits and Harrison Williams in a Senate Com-
mittee report on the 1966 FLSA amendments:
[T]he child we seek to protect is among the most oppressed and de-
prived of our citizens-the child of a Mexican-American family living
far below the poverty level, whose parents, for lack of a permanent
residence, cannot even vote and therefore exert no political influ-
ence .... In sum, this is a child who desperately needs to be brought
in from the fields and made a part of the society which the rest of
our children take for granted.24
The problems of poor education, poor health, inadequate day-care
facilities, and oppressive child labor all contribute to the plight of the
migrant child, creating a vicious cycle of poverty.
Ronald Goldfarb, who has written extensively on the subject of
migrant farmworkers, explains the ill effects of migrancy on educa-
tion:
Education is the classic route out of poverty. A painful reality is that
the very migrancy of these farmworkers often forecloses this route
to their children. Inherent in the migrant life is the special problem
of educating the young. When always on the move, there can be no
stable school life for children. Migrants live in many different places
during the school year; their children are constantly in and out of
different schools .... They have no assistance at home because their
parents are away all day and often are without means and abilities
to be helpful when they return. These children are strangers in a hard
and puzzling world.25
Many parents understand that education is the only way out of this
cycle of poverty and discourage their teenagers from working in the
fields.26 Yet, some parents have little choice but to have their children
work alongside them in the fields, because the average family income
is at poverty level.27
This seemingly inescapable cycle of poverty is complicated by the
problems of inadequate day-care facilities and the oppressive condi-
tions in which migrant children must work. Because many fields are
located in areas where there are not adequate day-care facilities, par-
ents usually bring their children with them to the field.2 Once the
23. R. GoibFaR,, Miua r F,-iT WOWRS: A CAsTE OF DESPAm 218 (1981).
24. S. REP. No. 1487, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 72, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONO. &
ADmN. NEws 3002, 3040.
25. R. GoLDFARB, supra note 23, at 46.
26. McConahay, supra note 22, at col. 2.
27. Id.
28. Harvest of Shame Hearing, supra note 13, at 38.
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children are between five and seven years old they begin to participate
in the harvest of the crops themselves. 29 As noted by Mr. Ortiz in his
comments to the House Committee on Aging, "Major efforts to aid
this community must be directed to the dependents, especially school-
age children and youth, in order to break the cycle [of poverty]. '"30
II. The Fair Labor Standards Act and Child Labor
Protections
The original enactment of the Fair Labor Standards Act in 1938
failed to provide any protection to farmworkers3' and, in fact, ex-
plicitly exempted agricultural workers from its coverage. This version
of the Act was passed despite President Roosevelt's May 24, 1937
statement to Congress: "Legislation can, I hope, be passed at this
session of the Congress further to help those who toil in factory and
on farm.' ' 32 The exclusion of farmworkers was due, in part, to the
view (promoted by powerful growers' lobbies) that agriculture was a
unique industry. 33 The myth persists even today that "working in the
fields is wholesome and worthwhile in comparison to working indoors
and that long hours and low wages somehow should be more ac-
ceptable to field workers no matter how back-breaking their work or
how despicable their work conditions." ' 34 Actually, migrant farm la-
borers may be the most vulnerable of all workers. Their health and
malnutrition is among the worst in the nation.35 The incidence of mal-
nutrition is higher among migrant workers than any other demo-
graphic group in the country.3 6 Moreover, the infant mortality rate for
migrants is 125 percent higher than the national average, and the life
expectancy of the migrant farmworker is only forty-nine years.3
7
Harvest of Shame, 8 Edward R. Murrow's 1960 documentary on
the deplorable conditions of migrant labor in American agriculture,
29. Id.
30. Id. at 14 (statement of George L Ortiz).
31. S. REP. No. 1487, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMN. NEws 3002, 3010.
32. Id. (emphasis added).
33. P. MATN, S. VAUPEL & D. EGAN, UNFULFILED PRONISE-COLLECTVE BARGAINING
IN CALFORNIA AGRICULTURE 29 (1988).
34. R. GOLDFARB, supra note 23, at 154.
35. Hunger Among Migrant and Seasonal Farmworkers: Hearing Before the House Select
Comm. on Hunger, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1986) [hereinafter Hunger Among Farmworkers
Hearing].
36. Id. at 59.
37. Id.
38. Harvest of Shame (CBS television broadcast, Nov. 30, 1960).
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drew national attention to the plight of the migrant farmworker in the
United States. The film helped garner popular support for the move-
ment to change this deplorable situation. 39 The 1960s were marked by
a shift in attitudes toward migrant farmworkers, with the result that
both the Democratic and Republican party platforms featured prom-
ises to improve living and working conditions for migrant laborers. 4°
In 1966, the Fair Labor Standards Act was amended to raise minimum
wages and extend protection to employees not previously covered un-
der the Act, including agricultural workers. 41 The 1966 amendments
also imposed prohibitions against oppressive child labor in agricul-
ture.42 The Senate report on the proposed 1966 amendments discusses
Congress' purpose in passing the FLSA in 1938 and the proven ef-
fectiveness of the Act in affording worker protections and stimulating
the economy.43 Congress extended the protections of the Act to farm-
39. The film was aired on Thanksgiving Day, 1960, and implored the American people
to hold themselves accountable to the agricultural workers that had labored to provide them
with the food on their tables:
A hundred and fifty different attempts have been made in Congress to do something
about the plight of the migrants. All except one has failed. The migrants have no
lobby. Only an enlightened, aroused, and perhaps angered public opinion can do
anything about the migrants.
The people you have seen have the strength to harvest your fruit and vegetables.
They do not have the strength to influence legislation. Maybe we do.
Id. (closing remarks of Edward R. Murrow).
40. P. MARTiN, HARvEST OF CoNFUSiON 6-7 (1988).
41. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601 § 203 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(6) (Supp. IV 1965-1968)).
42. Id. at 29 U.S.C. § 213(c) (Supp. IV 1965-1968).
43. The Fair Labor Standards Act was enacted in 1938 to meet the economic and
social problems of that era. Low wages, long working hours, and high unemployment
plagued the Nation, which was then in the midst of an unprecedented depression.
The policy of the act, as set forth therein, was to correct and as rapidly as practicable
to eliminate labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard
of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers.
The Fair Labor Standards Act has proven through the years that its basic concept
is sound. Despite the warnings of some critics who predicted the act would produce
economic disaster, we have seen our economy emerge stronger than ever. Far from
being an impediment to progress, the act has served as a foundation upon which
has been built a standard of living for our citizens which is second to none. It has
enabled countless Americans to enjoy a dignity, security, and a general well-being
which would not otherwise have been possible.
It is imperative, if the act is to have real meaning, that the minimum wage provide
earnings above the poverty level. It is a shocking fact that demands immediate
remedy that 41 percent of all children living in poverty were in families where there
is a worker who has a full-time job throughout the year.
S. REP. No. 1487,. 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-3, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CoNe. & ArmnN.
Naws 3002, 3002-04.
workers in 1966, because it recognized the correlation between the
migrant workers' oppressive working conditions, poverty, and their
exemption from the original FLSA:
Poverty is not restricted to the unemployed alone. Many who
are counted among the ranks of the poor are workers who receive
less than a living wage. One of the reasons for this is that they are
employed in industries outside the protections of the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act. Extending the coverage of the act will do much to relieve
the plight of these "working poor.'"
Today, however, more than fifty years after the original passage
of the Fair Labor Standards Act, and twenty-five years after the 1966
amendments extended FLSA protections to agricultural workers, the
plight of the migrant farmworker continues. Edward R. Roybal,
Chairman of the House Select Committee on Aging, recently re-
marked:
I have called this hearing today after 30 years when we first saw a
documentary by Edward R. Murrow who called it "The Harvest of
Shame."
Unfortunately, little has changed in the past 30 years .... We
will again hear that the farmworker still lives in the same deplorable
conditions....
Across the board, farmworkers seem to be treated as second
class citizens. Different labor standards, including child labor, ex-
emption from employee taxes, and lower Federal housing standards
are allowed for employed farm labor distinct from standards for all
other citizens .41
Thus, the plight of the migrant worker persists. Despite the inclusion
of agricultural employees under the FLSA, migrant farmworkers may
be the most underrepresented sector of workers in our society,46 and
their children are still more vulnerable to exploitation.
A. Child Labor Provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act
Like their adult counterparts, child farmworkers were excluded
from the 1938 Act and consequently remained vulnerable to oppressive
child labor practices.47 Despite a national outcry against children per-
forming sweatshop labor, the country seems to have ignored the prob-
lem of oppressive child labor in agriculture. One commentator has
44. Id. at 3, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmIN. NEWS 3002, 3004.
45. Harvest of Shame Hearing, supra note 13, at 1-2.
46. Migrant workers historically have had little access to legal services. R. GOLDFARB,
supra note 23, at 218.
47. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text; see also R. GOLDFARB, supra note 23,
at 159.
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noted, "The reason for this shocking neglect was the continuing mis-
conception that agriculture was not hard, difficult, or dangerous la-
bor.'' It is the persistence of this myth that has kept children in the
fields:
We have been told... that the toil of children in the fields is some-
how different from the sweat and strain of children in the textile
mills-that it is somehow cleaner, somehow more fun, less danger-
ous, and really educational-or at least "healthy." The opponents
of child labor laws will say this even though the cold facts are that
agriculture is the third most dangerous of all our Nation's industries,
exceeded only by mining and construction in the rate of death caused
by on-the-job accidents. 49
In 1974, further amendments were adopted prohibiting the employ-
ment of all children under the age of twelve in agriculture.5 0 But chil-
dren working outside of school hours on a family farm or with the
consent of the parents were exempted .5 A section was also added re-
quiring employers to provide proof of the child's age.52
Protections for child farmworkers remain inadequate because even
children under twelve can work on a "family farm," and can hand-
harvest with their parents' consent on smaller farms exempt from FLSA
minimum wage protection.5 3 Nonetheless, FLSA does carefully detail
the conditions under which children may and may not work. The Act
focuses primarily upon the age of the child, limiting or prohibiting
work by children during school hours. 54
For purposes of the FLSA "oppressive child labor" is defined
as the "employment of a minor in an occupation for which he does
not meet the minimum age standards of the Act, as set forth in § 570.2
[of the regulations implementing the FLSA]. "55 Section 570.2 provides
48. R. GomFAR, supra note 23, at 159.
49. S. REP. No. 1487, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess. 72, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CoDE CoNG. &
ADmN. NEws 3002, 3040 (supplemental views of Senators Jacob Javits and Harrison Williams
of New Jersey on child labor in agriculture).
50. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 25, 88 Stat. 72
(1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 212-213 (1988)).
51. Id. at 29 U.S.C. § 213(c)(1)(A) (1988); Agricultural Child Labor Provisions of FLSA,
1974: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public
Welfare, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
52. Fair Labor Standards Amendment of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259 §25(a), 88 Stat. 72
(1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 212(d) (1988)).
53. Id. at 29 U.S.C. § 213(c)(1)(A).
54. Id.
55. 29 C.F.R. § 570.1(b) (1990). 29 U.S.C. § 2030) (1988) defines "oppressive child
labor" as follows:
"Oppressive child labor" means a condition of employment under which (1) any
employee under the age of sixteen years is employed by an employer (other than a
parent or a person standing in place of a parent employing his own child or a child
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generally that children in agriculture must be sixteen years old before
they can work during school hours.16 Fourteen- to sixteen-year-olds
may work in agriculture after school hours. 7 Twelve- and thirteen-year-
olds may work after school hours with the written consent of a parent.5 8
After amendment in 1974, the FLSA prohibited nearly all agricultural
employment of child laborers under age twelve.5 9 Under a 1977 amend-
ment, however, the Secretary of Labor was given authority to waive
this prohibition with respect to ten- and eleven-year-old children har-
vesting short-season crops6° under non-hazardous conditions, as long
as the children are not employed for more than eight weeks during
the summer months and the grower certifies that workers over the age
of twelve are not available. 61 Despite these complex rules against op-
pressive child labor, many children remain completely unprotected by
the FLSA.
B. The "Family Farm" Exemption
Although these rigid guidelines proscribe oppressive child labor
in many contexts, section 213(a)(6)(B)-the "family farm" exemp-
tion-expressly excludes children from the protective provisions of the
Act when they are employed by a member of their "immediate
family. "62 When the parent is classified as an independent contractor,
in his custody under the age of sixteen years in an occupation other than manufac-
turing or mining or an occupation found by the Secretary of Labor to be particularly
hazardous for the employment of children between the ages of sixteen and eighteen
years or detrimental to their health or well-being) in any occupation, or (2) any
employee between the ages of sixteen and eighteen years is employed by an employer
in any occupation which the Secretary of Labor shall find and by order declare to
be particularly hazardous for the employment of children between such ages or
detrimental to their health or well-being; but oppressive child labor shall not be
deemed to exist by virtue of the employment in any occupation of any person with
respect to whom the employer shall have on file an unexpired certificate issued and
held pursuant to regulations of the Secretary of Labor certifying that such person
is above the oppressive child-labor age.
56. 29 C.F.R. § 570.2(b) (1990).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 25, 88 Stat. 72
(1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 212-213 (1988)).
60. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-151, § 8, 92 Stat. 1251
(1977) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 213(c)(4) (1988)). "Short-season crops" are defined
in the regulations as crops which have a "particularly short harvesting season:" "the variety
of each crop to be harvested must ordinarily be harvested within 4 weeks in the region in
which the waiver will be applicable." 29 C.F.R. § 575.5(a) (1990).
61. 29 U.S.C. § 213(c)(4)(A)(iii) (1988); see also, National Ass'n of Farmworkers Orgs.
v. Marshall, 628 F.2d 604, 606 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (FLSA safety requirement
contemplates "objective proof of safety" in the creation of a list of non-hazardous pesticides).
62. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(6)(B) (1988) exempts "any employee employed in agriculture ...
if such employee is the parent, spouse, child, or other member of his employer's immediate
family."
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the child no longer is considered an employee of the grower. Therefore
the child labor provisions and other protections afforded "employees"
do not apply.63 Thus, under a scheme in which migrant farmworkers
are treated as independent contractors, their children, who also work
the fields, are left unprotected from the abuses of oppressive child
labor. Under the family farm exemption, even children under twelve
are allowed to work in the fields without any federal regulation of
hours or working conditions A4 The only protective regulations appli-
cable to these children are state regulations requiring school-age chil-
dren to be physically present in school while it is in session.65 Thus,
during the summer months children may be forced to toil all day
alongside their parents in fields owned by large agricultural concerns,
and this does not constitute a violation of any federal child labor laws.
So long as a child is employed by a parent on a farm nominally owned
or "operated" by the parent, and works outside of normal school
hours, there is no age or hour limitation on the child's agricultural
labor .6
The family farm exemption stems from a tradition deeply imbed-
ded in the American value system. According to the American model
of the privately owned and managed family farm, all members of the
family, including the children, contribute their labor and share equally
in the fruits of the harvest. Indeed, "by 1910, nearly two million chil-
dren between ten and fifteen years of age were at work full-time, and
of these, nearly three-quarters were agricultural workers, the majority
of them employed by their own parents on the family farm." 67 When
the family was unable to contribute enough labor to run the farm
efficiently, outsiders or "hired hands" were sometimes brought in. 68
These hired hands were the predecessors of today's migrant farm-
workers, albeit on a far different socio-cultural footing:
The "hired hand" had a place in this family farm agriculture only
to the extent that he worked for wages on a neighbor's farm until
63. See Donovan v. Brandel, 736 F.2d 1114, 1115 (6th Cir. 1984).
64. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 25, 88 Stat. 72
(1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 213(c)(1)(A) (1988)).
65. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48200 (West 1978 & Supp. 1991) (requiring children
between the ages of six and eighteen to attend public or private school full-time). Most states
have education codes similar to that of California. All states, with the exception of Mississippi,
have compulsory school attendance laws. The standard age requirement is seven to fifteen
years old but varies. C.L. BRADEN, COMPULSORY SCHOOL ATTENDANCE LAWS AND THE JUVEILE
JUsncE SYsTEm 5 (Criminal Justice Monograph, Vol. VIII, No. 3, 1978). See, e.g., MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 120.101 (West Supp. 1991) (compulsory instruction from ages seven to sixteen);
N.Y. EDuc. LAW § 3205 (McKinney 1981) (compulsory education from ages six to sixteen).
66. See 29 C.F.R. § 570.2(b) (1990).
67. NATIONAL INDusTRiAL CoN RENcE BOARD, THE EmPLOymENT OF YoUNo PEasoNs iN
THE UNTrED STATEs 24-25 (1925).
68. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, FAu. LABOR FACT BOOK 67-68 (1959).
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he moved up the agricultural ladder by buying or homesteading his
own farm. Hired hand was only a temporary occupation; since these
future farmers were culturally and socially similar ....
[F]armworkers were believed to be interested primarily in the same
high farm prices and low transportation costs that concerned farm-
ers, not higher wages or job security. 69
Today the "hired hand" has been replaced by the migrant worker,
and the "family farm" is fast becoming a thing of the past.70 Studies
indicate that between 113,000 and 220,000 migrant farmworkers are
employed in California alone.71
Migrant farmworkers employed by large agricultural concerns do
not fit this historical prototype of the "hired hand." To characterize
the migrant worker as an independent business person contracting freely
with the grower is an extremely inaccurate portrayal of the true bal-
ance of power in the working relationship. Furthermore, character-
izing migrant child workers as children "helping out" on the family
farm or in an independent business operation is pure fiction. As noted
by Roger Sawyer in his book, Children Enslaved, the levels of ex-
ploitation suffered by farmworkers can be conceptualized as a series
of concentric circles: "[W]ithin the outer circle are the American ag-
ricultural workers; next come the migrant workers; next the child
workers, finally, in the centre, the more exploited category of all, the
child migrant workers.' '72
Familiar designations-" sharecropper" or "sharefarmer"-now
are applied in wholly inappropriate circumstances. Traditionally, a
sharefarmer entered into an agreement with the landowner allowing
him to enter onto the land, run an independent farming operation,
and repay the landowner with a portion of the crops harvested.7 1 It
is a stretch of the imagination, however, to characterize today's mi-
grant farmworkers and their families as managers of "independent
farming operations." In a majority of the contractual arrangements
between migrant workers and landowners, the farmworker exercises
little control over the care and management of the entire operation. 74
69. P. MARTnN, supra note 40, at 4.
70. "Statistics on farm foreclosures indicate that the family managed farm, once a
traditional American institution, is quickly moving toward extinction." Farm Crisis: Growing
Poverty and Hunger Among America's Food Producers, Hearing before the Domestic Task
Force House Select Committee on Hunger, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1987).
71. P. MARTN, supra note 40, at 103.
72. R. SAWYER, CHLDREN ENSLAVED 103 (1988).
73. "In essence, 'sharefarming agreements,' are those entered into by an owner of land,
who agrees to permit another to enter onto his land and cultivate/utilize it, in consideration
for a share of the profits/produce derived from the sharefarmer's cultivation/utilization."
Byrne, Sharefarming Agreements, 60 LAW INST. J. 686, 686 (1986).
74. See Linder, Employees, Not-So-Independent Contractors, and the Case of Migrant
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Workers often sign these independent contractor agreements only be-
cause they are forced to as a condition of employment. 75 Growers thus
manage to avoid liability under the FLSA provisions by manipulating
the formal designation of their relationship with their migrant work-
force.
In enacting the FLSA, Congress clearly stated its intent that only
sharefarmers who are truly employees, and not independent contrac-
tors, should enjoy the labor protection provisions of the FLSA. 76 By
requiring migrant workers with children to sign sharefarming contracts
as a condition of employment, and labeling them as independent con-
tractors, growers effectively escape liability for violations of the child
labor provisions of the FLSA. Congress, however, did not intend this
result. The legislative history of the 1966 amendments indicates that
workers who are closely directed by the landowner and exercise no
discretion are employees for purposes of the Act and are entitled to
its protections. 77
I. The Importance of the Distinction Between Independent
Contractor and Employee Status to the Migrant Worker
Creation of a class of workers exempt from FLSA protections is
not the only economic incentive for growers to insist on sharefarming
contracts. Sharefarming arrangements also tend to increase harvest
quality and decrease labor supervision costs.78 Taken together, these
economic factors constitute a powerful motivation for growers to im-
properly classify workers as independent contractors, when the eco-
nomic reality of the situation dictates that they should be designated
employees. 79 As a result, a number of cases arising in state and federal
Farmworkers: A Challenge to the "Law and Economics" Agency Doctrine, 15 N.Y.U. REv.
L. & Soc. CHANGE 425, 436-37 (1986-87).
75. "Pickle farmers in Ohio, Wisconsin, Michigan, Colorado, and Texas directly, without
recourse to a crewleader, recruit entire families of Mexican-American farmworkers in south
Texas to harvest their crop. They require the workers, as a condition of employment, to sign
a statement to the effect that they are independent contractors and not employees." Id. at
438.
76. See supra note 10.
77. Id.
78. See Linder, supra note 74, at 467-68.
79. Whether or not a grower truly believes the economic realities of the relationship justify
independent contractor, rather than employee, status, the grower knows that the designation
will go unchallenged in most instances:
[E]mployers' claims that their workers are exempt from protections tend to be
accepted until challenged in the courts. ... [A]s alleged independent contractors,
[the workers] are not subject to protections regarding child labor, minimum wage,
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courts have addressed the issue whether a migrant farmworker should
be labeled an independent contractor rather than an employee, and
if so, under what circumstances. 80
A. FLSA Definitions: Employer and Employee
The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 was enacted by Congress
as a remedial and humanitarian statute to address "the plight of work-
ing men and women who labored under unhealthy conditions for un-
limited numbers of hours. ' 81 The Act was designed to correct "labor
conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard
of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of
workers. "82
The terms "employee" and "employer" were defined in very broad
terms under the Act in order to protect workers from such deleterious
working conditions. 83 The FLSA defines "employee" as "any indi-
vidual employed by an employer" 84 and defines "employ" as "to suf-
fer or permit to work.' '85 These broad, vague definitions require fact
specific judicial interpretation of the Act's applicability in order to
serve its remedial and humanitarian purposes. 86 So far, courts have
engaged in a case-by-case determination of employee versus inde-
pendent contractor status, rather than strictly applying common law
principles. 87
or overtime pay. Nor do their employers pay for FICA, or state workers' compen-
sation, disability, or unemployment insurance.
Wells, Legal Conflict and Class Structure: The Independent Contractor-Employee Controversy
in California Agriculture, 21 LAW & Soc'y REv. 49, 63 (1987).
80. See, e.g., Secretary of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1538 (7th Cir. 1987)
(migrant farmworkers picking pickles were employees of farmers); Donovan v. Brandel, 736
F.2d 1114, 1115 (6th Cir. 1984) (migrant farmworkers who contracted to harvest pickle crops
were not "employees"); Real v. Driscoll Strawberry Assocs., 603 F.2d 748, 755 (9th Cir. 1979)
(strawberry grower was employer of farmworkers); Maldonado v. Lucca, 629 F. Supp. 483,
484 (D.N.J. 1986) (blueberry grower and crew leader were "joint employers" of farmworkers);
Donovan v. Gillmor, 535 F. Supp. 154, 163 (N.D. Ohio 1982) (migrant workers were
"employees" for purposes of the FLSA); S.G. Borello & Sons v. Dep't of Indus. Relations,
48 Cal. 3d 341, 346, 769 P.2d 399, 401, 256 Cal. Rptr. 543, 545 (1989) (migrant cucumber
harvesters under sharefarming contracts were "employees" for purposes of the FLSA).
81. R. GOLDFARB, supra note 23, at 153.
82. Dunlop v. Carriage Carpet Co., 548 F.2d 139, 143 (6th Cir. 1977) (citing 29 U.S.C.
§ 202(a) (1988)).
83. Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 727-28 (1947).
84. 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) (1988).
85. 29 U.S.C. § 203(g) (1988).
86. Donovan v. Brandel, 736 F.2d 1114, 1116 (6th Cir. 1984).
87. Id. Under English common law, two tests were utilized to determine employee status.
Linder, supra note 74, at 443-44. These two tests are: the "nature of work test," emphasizing
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The United States Supreme Court has endorsed a broad inter-
pretive approach toward the terms "employee" and "independent
contractor" under the Fair Labor Standards Act:
The very specificity of the exemptions [to FLSA protections]... and
the generality of the employment definitions indicates that the terms
"employment" and "employee," are to be construed [broadly] to
accomplish the purposes of the legislation .... [A] constricted in-
terpretation would only make for a continuance, to a considerable
degree, of the difficulties for which the remedy was devised and would
invite adroit schemes by some employers and employees to avoid the
immediate burdens at the expense of the benefits sought by the leg-
islation. These considerations have heretofore guided our construc-
tion of the Act.8"
Consistent with this broad approach, the Court has held that the ex-
istence of an agreement labeling the worker an "independent con-
tractor" is not dispositive of the issue: "Where the work done, in its
essence, follows the usual path of an employee, putting on an 'in-
dependent contractor' label does not take the worker from the pro-
tection of the Act."u 9 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's endorsement
of a "broad interpretation" of the term "employee" for purposes of
the FLSA does not indicate how expansive this "broad interpretation"
is to be. As noted by Judge Easterbrook, "[A]lways the question about
a 'remedial' statute is, how much help was it intended to give the ben-
efited group?" 9° Because there is no legislative guidance as to when
an agricultural worker properly is deemed to be an independent con-
tractor rather than an employee, 91 courts must make this determination
on a case-by-case basis.
B. Advantages of the Independent Contractor Designation for Growers
In addition to creating a legal category of workers exempt from
FLSA labor protections, sharefarming arrangements offer other ad-
the relative skill and expertise of the two parties and the degree to which the worker's activity
is integrated into the employer's business; and the "control test," focusing exclusively on the
physical control of the worker by the employer. Id.
88. United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 711-12 (1946) (footnotes omitted) (citing Buckstaff
Bath House Co. v. McKinley, 308 U.S. 358 (1939); Social Sec. Bd. v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358
(1946)).
89. Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 729 (1947); see also Brock v.
Superior Care, Inc., 840 F.2d 1054, 1059 (2d Cir. 1988) ("Though an employer's self-serving
label of workers as independent contractors is not controlling ... an employer's admission
that his workers are employees covered by the FLSA is highly probative."); Real v. Driscoll
Strawberry Assocs., 603 F.2d 748, 755 (9th Cir. 1979) ("economic realities, not contractual
labels, determine employment status for the remedial purposes of the FLSA").
90. Secretary of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1543 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook,
J., concurring) (emphasis in original) (citing Moore v. Tandy Corp., 819 F.2d 820, 822 (7th
Cir. 1987)).
91. Id.
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vantages to growers. For example, sharefarming discourages unioni-
zation of the workers. Professor Miriam Wells describes some
motivations of strawberry growers for creating sharefarming con-
tracts:
The adoption of sharecropping .. .promised some relief from the
pressures confronting the industry. It was a course of action pursued
primarily by larger growers whose scale made them likely targets for
the union, rendered them subject to protective legislation, and ham-
pered the close personalistic ties through which smaller berry growers
discouraged unionization. 92
These arrangements are particularly attractive to growers when the
quality of hand labor is a major determinant of profitability. Workers
logically will pay more attention to the quality of their work if their
livelihoods depend upon the quality of the harvest, rather than mere
quantity. For example, with crops such as cucumbers destined for pickle
production, the size and shape of the cucumbers determine the market
price paid for the harvest. 9 The sharefarmer receives a proportionate
share of the profits from the produce sold and therefore has a stake
in the quality of the crop. This arrangement provides worker incentive
and reduces the need for supervision. The Sixth Circuit further de-
scribed the advantages of sharefarming contracts to cucumber grow-
ers:
This method of "subcontracting" was found to have been imple-
mented because of the unique aspects of pickle marketing. Unlike
most other crops, the market price of the pickles does not increase
proportionately with their size, i.e., there are seven specific size grades,
and the smaller pickles bring a higher price per pound than larger
pickles. Paying harvesters on a piecework basis had proved to be less
profitable because of the extensive and ineffective supervision it re-
quired.94
"Piecework" or "piece rate" payment is a system by which workers
are paid a set price per basket picked. "The 'piece rate' varies with
the size of the particular vegetable or fruit being harvested." 95 The
same is true of strawberries:
The fragility of the fruit, along with the need to constantly manicure
and weed the plants in the course of harvest, means that workers
must exert care, some skill, and judgment. Crop yields are a function
of carefully monitored planting and harvest schedules, and harvest
92. Wells, supra note 79, at 73-74.
93. Donovan v. Brandel, 736 F.2d 1114, 1116 (6th Cir. 1984).
94. Id.
95. Hodgson v. Griffen & Brand of McAllen, Inc., 471 F.2d 235, 236 (5th Cir.), reh'g
denied, 472 F.2d 1405, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 819 (1973).
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selection, handling and packing are prime determinants of market
price.9
Under a straight piece rate arrangement, in which the farmworker
is paid by the bucket picked or by weight, the worker is more likely
to be sloppy and include crops of inferior quality. Having to con-
stantly police workers in the fields to ensure that they pick only the
crops most suitable for market is very costly to the grower.
In a sharefarming arrangement, however, the worker is given con-
siderable incentive to pay attention to quality control. Obviously, if
the migrant worker's income is derived solely from a percentage share
of the profits made, the worker will have an increased incentive to
maximize profits by picking only the most marketable crops. Thus,
the burden and expense of quality control are shifted from the grower
to the worker. Sharefarming arrangements are used by growers not
only to avoid the expense of compliance with the FLSA, but also to
shift the burden of harvest selection and worker supervision onto the
workers themselves.
C. Crew Leaders and the Joint Employer Doctrine
(1) Crew leaders
Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, only an "employer"97 is
responsible to'the migrant farmworker for compliance with the Act's
protections. A grower must comply with the FLSA only if he, rather
than some other person or entity, is determined to be the worker's
"employer." A method used by growers to avoid the requirements of
the Fair Labor Standards Act is to shift employer responsibilities to
a crew leader. Crew leaders are contractually hired labor recruiters.
They supply growers with sufficient numbers of migrant farmworkers
during critical periods in the harvest season.98 The crew leaders are
responsible for recruiting workers, transporting them to the work site
(sometimes from more than a thousand miles away), and directing the
workers in the fields.9 Almost all crew leaders themselves have spent
much of their lives as migrant farmworkers, 1'1 but they somehow man-
96. Wells, supra note 79, at 54 (citation omitted).
97. 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1988).
98. B. AsHAaBRAN-R, supra note 14, at 32.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 33.
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aged to acquire the start-up capital for the equipment and transpor-
tation necessary to go into business as crew leaders.' 0' The crew leaders
usually receive a percentage of their crew's earnings, which makes their
earnings subject to the same vagaries of weather, market fluctuation,
and labor supply that affect growers and farmworkers. In addition,
the crew leader must pay for the costs of recruitment, such as trans-
portation, equipment (including buses, gasoline, repairs), and insur-
ance. 102 As a result, many crew leaders lead as shaky a financial
existence as the workers and eventually go out of business.103 The crew
leader is hired by the grower as an independent contractor, and grow-
ers usually attempt to shift responsibility for worker protections under
the FLSA to the crew leader by claiming that the crew leader is the
workers' sole employer.0°4 The growers often are able "to shift re-
sponsibility for violations of various legal protections to crew lead-
ers. " '105
This works a hardship on migrant farmworkers "who are un-
derpaid in the first instance and who cannot realistically recover un-
paid wages from a crew leader who is undercapitalized and nowhere
to be found."' Despite the fact that the migrant farmworkers des-
ignated as the crew leader's employees are theoretically protected by
the FLSA, actual protection under the Act is extremely elusive given
that the crew leaders themselves are migrant workers.
(2) The Joint Employer Doctrine
Despite claims by growers that the crew leaders are the sole em-
ployers of the migrant workers and thus solely responsible for com-
pliance with the FLSA, courts sometimes look beyond this subterfuge
and hold both the crew leader and the grower responsible as "joint
employers." 1° Under the joint employer doctrine, two or more sep-
arate entities or individuals are considered simultaneous "employers"
of the farmworker:
101. Id. at 32-33.
102. Id. at 33.
103. Id.
104. Tierce, The Joint Employer Doctrine Under the Federal Migrant and Seasonal Agri-
cultural Workers Protection Act, 18 RUToERs L.J. 863, 866 (1987).
105. Tierce notes that "[flarmers have often sought to avoid compliance and liability under
federal and state statutory and common law by claiming that the crew leaders who recruited
the farmworkers are independent contractors and, therefore, responsible for any statutory
violations or duties imposed by law." Id. at 865.
106. Maldonado v. Lucca, 629 F. Supp. 483, 489 (D.N.J. 1986).
107. Hodgson v. Griffin & Brand of McAllen, Inc., 471 F.2d 235, 237 (5th Cir.), reh'g
denied, 472 F.2d 1405, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 819 (1973); see also Maldonado, 629 F. Supp.
at 487.
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A joint employment relationship is generally deemed to exist (1) where
one employer is acting directly or indirectly in the other's interest in
relation to the employee and (2) where the employers are "not com-
pletely disassociated with respect to the employment of a particular
employee and may be deemed to share control of the employee, di-
rectly or indirectly, by reason of the fact that one employer controls,
is controlled by, or is under common control with the other em-
ployer."10'
By holding both the growers and the crew leaders responsible for com-
pliance with the FLSA as joint employers, the courts can defeat grow-
ers' attempts to insulate themselves from liability by interposing a
middleman, the crew leader, between themselves and their workers.
In Hodgson v. Griffin & Brand of McAllen, Inc.,109 a leading case
on the joint employer doctrine, the court pierced the "independent
contractor veil" and held both the crew leader and the grower liable
as joint employers. The plaintiff in Hodgson sought to enjoin a grower
from violating the minimum wage, record-keeping, and child labor
provisions of the FLSA."0 The grower did not dispute that violations
had occurred, but vigorously denied that it was the farmworkers' em-
ployer because the workers had been hired by a crew leader who was
an independent contractor."' The court disagreed with the grower and
held that "independent contractor status does not necessarily imply
the contractor [crew leader] is solely responsible for his employees
under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Another employer may be jointly
responsible for the contractor's employees." 2 Thus, the grower could
not escape liability for violating child labor provisions of the FLSA
by merely passing on the "employer" title to the crew leader. The
Hodgson court emphasized the need to focus on the economic reality
underlying these relationships in determining -whether the grower is,
in fact, the farmworkers' employer.13 The joint employer doctrine
thus allows the courts to examine the totality of the circumstances and
recognize that a crew leader, himself a migrant worker, is not the sole
employer of the farmworker. Instead, the crew leader is really no more
than an agent of the grower." 4 By naming the grower a joint employer
of the farm labor crew, the court focuses on the realities of the ec-
108. Maldonado, 629 F. Supp. at 487 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 791.2(b)(2), (3) (1990)).
109. 471 F.2d 235 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 472 F.2d 1405, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 819
(1973).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 237.
112. Id. (citing Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473 (1964); Mitchell v. Hertzke, 234
F.2d 183 (10th Cir. 1956); Fahs v. Tree-Gold Co-op Growers, 166 F.2d 40 (5th Cir. 1948)).
113. Id. (citing-Shultz v. Hinojosa, 432 F.2d 259, 264 (5th Cir. 1970)).
114. R. GoLn FA.a, supra note 23, at 22.
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onomic power structure involved and eliminates a legal loophole by
which a grower may escape his duty to provide FLSA protections by
shifting "employer" responsibilities to the crew leader.
D. Recent Developments in the Controversy Over Migrant Worker
Employment Status in California
The California Supreme Court considered the question whether
sharefarmers should be treated as "employees" or "independent con-
tractors" to be of such vital importance that it reviewed sua sponte
a ruling on the issue by the Sixth District Court of Appeal. In Borello
& Sons v. Department of Industrial Relations,"5 the court held that
the sharefarmers in question were employees of the grower, not in-
dependent contractors, and therefore were entitled to the protections
of the FLSA. l 6 The primary focus of Borello was the growers' duty
to pay workers' compensation premiums. Although the growers orig-
inally were cited for violating the child labor laws as well, those charges
were dropped." 7 Nevertheless, the decision is important to the issue
of migrant child farm labor in California because the court's deter-
mination that a parent sharefarmer is an employee of the grower, rather
than an independent contractor, removes migrant child labor from the
"family farm" exemption. As a result of this decision, "fewer in-
dependent contractor relationships will be recognized and employers
will have to make people employees.""' Thus, any grower found to
be a joint employer can no longer evade the child labor provisions of
the FLSA.
Borello sent a clear message to California growers that the courts
will uphold the remedial and humanitarian purposes of the FLSA in
determining whether sharefarmers are employees or independent con-
tractors. This is apparent from the court's reluctance to classify shar-
efarmers as independent contractors because such a classification would
remove them from statutory protection:
A conclusion that the sharefarmers are "independent contractors"
under the Act would suggest a disturbing means of avoiding an em-
ployer's obligations under other California legislation intended for
the protection of "employees," including laws enacted specifically
for the protection of agricultural labor ... [such as] laws governing
115. 48 Cal. 3d 341, 769 P.2d 399, 256 Cal. Rptr 543 (1989) (en bane).
116. Id. at 346, 769 P.2d at 401, 256 Cal. Rptr at 545.
117. Id. at 348 n.4, 769 P.2d at 402 n.4, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 546 n.4.
118. Sharefarmer Deemed Employee Under Workers' Comp., L.A. Daily J., Mar. 24,
1989, at 10, col. 1. It is estimated that about 20,000 sharefarmers in California will be directly
affected by this decision. Echenique, supra note 1, at 33.
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minimum wages, maximum hours, and (as illustrated in this case)
employment of minors .... 119
Joan Graff, Executive Director of the Employment Law Center, an
intervenor in Borello, stated, "[M]any members of the working poor
who are often the victims of independent contractor arrangements will
now be properly considered employees and be protected by [the] wealth
of laws that exist for them." 120
In Borello, the California Supreme Court rejected earlier state
decisions that followed common law tradition. Those earlier decisions
uniformly had declared that "the principal test of an employment re-
lationship is whether the person to whom service is rendered has the
right to control the manner and means of accomplishing the result
desired." 121 This common law approach focused on the degree of con-
trol involved in the working relationship.'2 Rejecting this approach,
the California Supreme Court held that while the "right to control"
test is a significant factor to be weighed in determining whether or
not a worker is an employee, other considerations also must be weighed.
The court included in those considerations the six-factor test employed
in Real v. Driscoll Strawberry Associates.l This test is to be applied
in light of the remedial purposes of the FLSA 24 and the intent of Con-
gress to "free commerce from production of goods under conditions
that [are] detrimental to the health and well-being of workers.' 1 25 The
test adopted by the Borello court is virtually identical to the test used
by federal courts. 26 The first five factors to be considered are:
(1) the alleged employee's opportunity for profit or loss depending
on his managerial skill; (2) the alleged employee's investment in
equipment or materials required for his task, or his employment of
helpers; (3) whether the service rendered requires a special skill; (4)
the degree of permanence of the working relationship; and (5) whether
the service rendered is an integral part of the alleged employer's busi-
ness.127
119. Borello, 48 Cal. 3d at 359, 769 P.2d at 410, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 554.
120. Sharefarmer Deemed Employee Under Workers' Comp., L.A. Daily J., Mar. 24,
1989, at 10, col. 2.
121. Borello, 48 Cal. 3d at 350, 769 P.2d at 404, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 548 (quoting Tieberg
v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 2 Cal. 3d 943, 946, 471 P.2d 975, 88 Cal. Rptr. 175
(1970)).
122. Linder, supra note 74, at 444.
123. 603 F.2d 748, 754 (9th Cir. 1979).
124. Id.
125. Rutherford v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 727 (1946).
126. See, e.g., Secretary of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1536-38 (7th Cir. 1987);
Donovan v. Brandel, 736 F.2d 1114, 1117-20 (6th Cir. 1984); Real v. Driscoll Strawberry
Assocs., 603 F.2d 748, 754 (9th Cir. 1979); Donovan v. Gillmor, 535 F. Supp. 154, 161-63
(N.D. Ohio 1982).
127. Borello, 48 Cal. 3d at 355, 769 P.2d at 407, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 551 (citing Real v.
Driscoll Strawberry Assocs., 603 F.2d 748, 754 (9th Cir. 1979)).
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The sixth factor used by the Borello court is the employer's "right
to control the work.' 1 28
Although Borello uses a six-part test in determining employee
status, the five enumerated factors plus the "right to control" test,
some courts use essentially the same factors but as a five-part test.
For example in Donovan v. Brandel,129 the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit listed five factors identical to five of the Borello fac-
tors: (1) permanency of the relationship; (2) degree of skill required;
(3) worker's capital investment; (4) opportunity for profit or loss; and
(5) employer's right to control.130 The court then added that an ad-
ditional factor, not specifically addressed by the trial court, "may be
whether the service rendered is an integral part of the alleged em-
ployer's business." 31 This, of course, parallels the fifth Borello factor.
In other words, both federal and California courts determine
whether workers are "employees" under the Act on a case-by-case
basis, with the determination of a worker's status depending "upon
the circumstances of the whole activity. "13 2 Despite a thorough judicial
analysis of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the employ-
ment relationship, decisions of such vital importance to the lives and
livelihoods of migrant workers arguably should be handled by the leg-
islature and should not be left to the inconsistencies of ad hoc judicial
determination.
128. Id. at 354, 769 P.2d at 407, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 551. The "right to control" test has
been criticized because it "looks exclusively at the personal, physical subordination of the
worker to the employer at the work site and ignores the overriding socioeconomic dependence
of employees on the employing class that manifests itself in the individual employment
relationship." Linder, supra note 74, at 446.
This overriding socioeconomic dependence is aptly illustrated by Sonia Nazario, reporter for
the Wall Street Journal:
The life [migrant farmworkers] lead isn't much different from migrants' life 20 years
ago. Today's migrants earn, on the average, only about $7,000 a year, and they
have problems receiving welfare benefits because they must reapply for assistance
and wait one month to receive benefits again every time they move .... Cases of
peonage, where workers are enslaved by crew chiefs, still exist, according to the
Department of Labor. Child labor remains common. Housing is short, and ...
some families here still live in trucks or in the lemon groves.
[According to one migrant worker], [hier crew chief wouldn't pay the minimum
wage, but work was hard to get and a complaint could get you blacklisted ....
"People want out, but they don't see any options. They think, 'This is all I can
do."'
Nazario, Leaving the Fields, More Farm Workers Are Finding New Jobs, Settling in One
Place, Wall St. J., Jun. 26, 1986, at 1, col. 1.
Nevertheless, courts, continue to rely on the "right to control" factor in determining
employee status in sharefarming cases.
129. 736 F.2d 1114 (6th Cir. 1984).
130. Id. at 1117-19.
131. Id. at 1119-20.
132. Rutherford v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 730 (1947).
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IV. Inherent Defectiveness of Case-By-Case Analysis
A case-by-case determination encourages growers to designate all
migrant farmworkers as independent contractors because it is unlikely
that any worker will go to the expense and burden of litigating the
issue to secure worker protections. Judge Easterbrook, in his con-
curring opinion in Secretary of Labor v. Lauritzen,33 notes the un-
desirability of de novo, case-by-case determination of employee status:
Litigation is costly and introduces risk into any endeavor; we should
struggle to eliminate the risk and help people save the costs....
Courts have had plenty of experience with the application of the FLSA
to migrant farmworkers. Fifty years after the Act's passage is too
late to say that we still do not have a legal rule to govern these cases.
My colleagues' balancing approach is the prevailing method, which
they apply carefully. But it is unsatisfactory both because it offers
little guidance for future cases and because any balancing test begs
questions about which aspects of "economic reality" matter, and
why. 134
An opposite result would be reached if the courts or the legislature
created a presumption that migrant farmworkers are employees and
not independent contractors. Without this protection, however, work-
ers will continue to be forced, as a condition of employment, to sign
statements labeling them as independent contractors and not em-
ployees. 35
A case-by-case determination of employee status presents three
additional problems. First, requiring migrant farmworkers to chal-
lenge the growers in court in order to vindicate their rights under the
FLSA ignores the reality of the workers' extreme economic depend-
ence upon the grower. Second, even if federal and state courts uni-
formly adopt the Borello six-part test for determining employee status,
there would be a lack of uniformity in its application. This could force-
parties to litigate without any clear predictability as to how the test
will be interpreted under varying factual circumstances. Finally, liti-
133. 835 F.2d 1529 (7th Cir. 1987).
134. Id. at 1539 (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
135. See Linder, supra note 74, at 438. These are often lengthy, complicated contracts,
written in English. See, e.g., Real v. Driscoll Strawberry Assocs., 603 F2d. 748, 750 n.1 (9th
Cir. 1979). The Real court described the contract between the grower and the migrant worker:
The Agreement, written in English, consists of seventeen, legal-size pages containing
much legal terminology. The appellants, all Spanish-speakers, allegedly never have
mastered the English language. In most cases, a sublicensee signs the Agreement
only once. Thereafter, the parties annually extend the Agreement by means of a
one- to two-page "addendum" signed by Driscoll [the grower], DSA [the produce
buyer] and the individual "Sub-Licensee."
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gation may be tainted by erroneous attitudes and insensitivity to the
plight of the migrant family in general.
A. Economic Realities
Perhaps more than any other laborers, migrant workers are ec-
onomically dependent on their employers. They customarily receive
pay well below the federal minimum wage. 36 Because they migrate
across the country to follow the cycle of seasonal crops, they are de-
pendent on these limited seasonal periods for the bulk of their annual
incomes. Their economic dependence allows them little choice as to
their employment relationships and working conditions.
Yet despite this economic reality, a migrant worker's only re-
course when faced with unfair labor practices is the tremendous bur-
den of litigation. Moreover, the worker is pitted not only against a
powerful grower, but also against other area growers who clearly have
a stake in the outcome of the litigation. The workers are further bur-
dened by the courts' application of FLSA provisions defining em-
ployee status because the courts fail to uniformly recognize the realities
of economic dependency. Even if an amendment to the FLSA were
enacted creating a presumption of employee status in sharefarming
contracts, a worker's only recourse in vindicating his FLSA rights would
still be through the judicial system, a system fraught with inconsistent
and unpredictable rulings. Marc Linder, a labor lawyer from south
Texas argues:
For the purposes of federal employment relations legislation, migrant
farm labor should qualify as the prototype of employment depend-
ency. Yet in spite of more than two decades of federal labor law
directed towards guaranteeing protection of migrant agricultural
workers, a considerable portion of all private actions brought under
legislation such as .. .the FLSA on their [sic] behalf of migrant
farmworkers has been and continues to be bogged down in the Sis-
yphean labor of proving time and again that the plaintiffs are not
independent contractors or employees of judgment-proof, straw-men
crewleaders or contractors, but are indeed employees of powerful and
financially responsible agricultural employers. 13 7
Aside from the obvious expense of litigation, workers are reluc-
tant to seek redress in the courts for other reasons. They often are
ignorant of their rights and are "afraid to press their complaints be-
136. Only 44% of all farmworkers are legally entitled to the federal minimum wage.
Harvest of Shame Hearing, supra note 13, at 216 (Report of JoAnne Kane, McAuley Inst.);
see 29 U.S.C. §206 (1988) for minimum wage provisions.
137. Linder, supra note 74, at 436-47 (citations omitted).
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cause of the strength of the forces working against them.' 31 3
B. Arbitrariness in Application of the Six-Part Test
The second problem inherent in a case-by-case determination of
employee status is the lack of uniformity and predictability in applying
the Borello six-part test. Despite using virtually identical guidelines in
determining employment status, various federal courts have come to
different conclusions about employment relationships in virtually iden-
tical fact situations.
For example, in Donovan v. Gillmor,139 an Ohio district court
determined that migrant pickle farmers were employees rather than
independent contractors. 4' The growers therefore were held liable for
violations of the FLSA child labor provisions. The court listed the
bases for its conclusion: (1) the defendant growers had entire control
over the cucumber crop; (2) the investment contributed by the migrant
workers was nearly zero; (3) the migrant workers' "opportunity for
profit" must be seen for what it really was-wages paid for pickles
picked with no possibility of loss because the migrants had no in-
vestment to lose; (4) the job required little skill, demonstrated by the
fact that children under the age of twelve were working in the fields;
and (5) the working relationship was, in essence, permanent.1 41
Two years later, in Donovan v. Brandel,142 the Sixth Circuit, fo-
cusing on the same factors, 43 reached the opposite conclusion under
nearly identical factual circumstances. The Brandel court held that
migrant pickle farmers in Michigan were not employees under the
FLSA, but rather independent contractors.144 The defendant grower
in Brandel was charged with continuous violations of the FLSA's child
labor and record keeping provisions. 45 The Sixth Circuit found that:
(1) The grower lacked the right to control the details of the harvesting
(despite the fact that he supplied irrigation and pesticides); 146 (2) the
grower's ownership of a large amount of farming equipment was in-
significant because that equipment was not primarily involved in the
workers' actual task of pickle harvesting; 147 (3) because the pickle har-
138. R. GoLDFARB, supra note 23, at 65.
139. 535 F. Supp. 154 (N.D. Ohio 1982).
140. Id. at 163.
141. Id. at 161-63.
142. 736 F.2d 1114 (6th Cir. 1984).
143. Id. at 1117-20.
144. Id. at 1120.
145. Id. at 1115.
146. Id. at 1119.
147. Id. at 1118-19.
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vesters' "remuneration increases by their successful managing of the
harvest process," the workers realized opportunity for profit (though
no possibility of loss existed); 14 8 (4) knowledge of methods of maxi-
mizing cucumber production constituted a "skill," setting the laborers
apart from harvesters of other crops (despite the fact that young chil-
dren regularly exercised this "skill");149 and (5) the relationship be-
tween the grower and the workers was not permanent.1 50
The conflicting disposition of these two very similar cases clearly
illustrates that the language of the six-factor test can be manipulated
to support arbitrary and inconsistent conclusions. Therefore, uniform
legislation is necessary to prevent ad hoc determinations that may not
further the congressional purposes behind the FLSA.
C. Erroneous Attitudes
Another problem inherent in case-by-case determination of em-
ployer liability for violations of the FLSA is the courts' insensitivity
to the plight of the children forced to work alongside their parents
in the field. In Brandel, the trial court was of the opinion that "the
migrants' primary purpose in bringing their children to Brandel's fields
was the opportunity to develop basic skills and family unity."' 5 Glibly
noting that the younger children spend more of their time playing than
working, 5 2 the Brandel court completely missed the point that most
migrant parents desperately need the income produced by their school-
age children and are unable to afford child care for their pre-school
age children. It is doubtful that a migrant parent would prefer to have
her young child playing alongside irrigation ditches tainted with pes-
ticides while she tries to earn her "share" of the harvest profits. In-
deed, migrant children working or playing alongside their parents in
the fields may be exposed to more deleterious conditions than any
other group of children in the nation:
Widespread health problems among migrant and seasonal farm-
worker children include high infant mortality, below average height,
upper respiratory infections, parasitic conditions, skin infections,
chronic diarrhea, and vitamin A deficiency. Poor nutrition coupled
with water deprivation increases the toxic effects of pesticides. 53
148. Id. at 1119.
149. Id. at 1117-18.
150. Id. at 1117.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1116.
153. Hunger Among Farmworkers Hearing, supra note 35, at 59 (citing the Farmworker
Justice Fund, The Occupational Health of Migrant and Seasonal Farmworkers in the U.S.
(1986)).
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Such misperception and insensitivity to the needs of migrant chil-
dren are prevalent in many courts and administrative agencies. United
States Department of Labor Administrative Law Judge James J. But-
ler was quoted as saying, "it's customary for migrant children to be
in the fields with their parents. They probably can't speak English
anyway, and would be bored in school. ' 154 Perhaps Judge Butler has
failed to notice that malnutrition, disease, pesticide poisoning, and an
early mortality rate are also "customary" for migrant children. 5 5 But
clearly, their being "customary" cannot justify these oppressive and
dangerous conditions of child labor.
Not surprisingly, many growers share Judge Butler's attitude. A
Hollister, California, cucumber grower commented, "The children
would much rather be with their families than at day care. They don't
learn anything in day care anyway. Here they're learning to be self-
sufficient." 56
Judicial insensitivity and misperception, however, are not uni-
versal. Ohio District Judge Walinski disagrees with the prevailing as-
sessment of migrant child labor as a form of "self-sufficiency" training:
Farm work performed by migrant workers is unskilled labor.
There can be no argument to the contrary on this issue. No special
training or experience is necessary to perform the task of picking
pickles. The fact that this migrant labor is unskilled is borne out by
the allegations that children under the age of 12 were in the fields
working. i
7
Judge Walinski, unlike other judges and administrative officers, is
unwilling to perpetuate the myth that the labor of migrant children
in the fields is healthy or provides safe, early "vocational training."
On the contrary, working in the fields is extremely dangerous for chil-
dren and teaches them no special "skills."
154. Echenique, Children's Harvest, S.F. Chron., Feb. 19, 1989, at 10, col. I (This World).
155. Taylor reports the following anecdotal evidence of the tragic toll field work and
poverty take on migrant children:
In Colorado, Dr. Peter Chase, a pediatrician teaching at the University of Colorado
medical school, studied 300 migrant children from 151 families. Clinical tests revealed
various signs of serious malnutrition, including evidence of growth retardation,
rickets, and marasmus. One or two children showed early symptoms of kwashiorkor,
a gross form of malnutrition normally seen only in the most underdeveloped nations.
Dr. Chase reported these seasonal farm worker families suffered an infant mortality
rate three times the national average; half their children had never been immunized
against diphtheria, pertussis, tetanus, or polio; 10 percent had never seen a doctor.
Fifty percent of the children had serious vitamin deficiencies and among this deficient
group the doctor found more frequent skin and upper respiratory tract infections.
R. TAYLOR, SWEATSHOP S IN THE SUN: CHmD LABOR ON THE FARM 156-57 (1973).
156. Echenique, supra note 154.
157. Donovan v. Gillmor, 535 F. Supp. 154, 162 (N.D. Ohio 1982).
July 1991]
The argument that family unity and the teaching of traditional
"skills" justify either oppressive conditions of child labor or the denial
of basic educational privileges to migrant children is not only inher-
ently wrong, it is racist. It implies that parents of Hispanic origin,
unlike other parents, would rather see their children continue the tra-
dition of poverty and disenfranchisement than obtain an education;
that they choose this course out of preference, not necessity. This as-
sumption completely ignores the reality of migrant parents. They
struggle to provide for their families in a labor market in which they
compete with similarly desperate workers who are willing to work for
sub-minimum wages.
Such racist assumptions about migrant parents' value systems
ought not to obscure the real human tragedy of child agricultural la-
bor. School age children and infants should not be in the fields. The
fields are especially dangerous for developing children: "Toxic chem-
ical pesticides, such as 'Monitor,' are being widely used, and already
there have been deaths despite a Californian regulation prohibiting
workers from entering a field within twenty-four hours of its being
sprayed.''58 Also, the burdens of agricultural labor, such as "stoop
labor," can warp the physical development of children employed in
the fields. 59 In light of the undeniable harm child agricultural labor
causes, judicial insensitivity to the plight of migrant families is in-
excusable.
V. The Importance of Employment Status in the Abolition
of Abuses Against the Child Migrant Farmworker
To avoid violating the FLSA's child labor provisions,' ° an em-
ployer who wishes to employ a child ordinarily must acquire a work
permit certificate for that child.' 6' But if the grower successfully clas-
sifies the child's parent as an independent contractor, the child be-
comes, in effect, an "employee" of her parent rather than the grower,
and the grower is exempt from the FLSA's permit requirement. More-
over, the grower is not required to comply with any of the Act's child
protection provisions because the child is not considered the grower's
158. R. SAWYER, supra note 72, at 105.
159. Id. at 104.
160. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 212(a), 215(a)(1) (1988) (prohibiting the transportation in commerce
of goods produced by the employment of oppressive child labor).
161. 29 C.F.R. §§ 570.5-570.12 (1990). Penalties for violations of the Act's child labor
provisions include civil fines up to $1000 for each violation, 29 C.F.R. § 579 (1990), and
criminal fines of up to $10,000 or imprisonment of up to six months or both for any person
who willfully violates those provisions, 29 U.S.C. § 216(a) (1988) (imprisonment only after
repeat offenses).
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"employee." A child working for a parent in an "independent busi-
ness operation" is exempt from the Act's coverage. 62 Thus, the child
worker completely slips through the cracks of the FLSA. For example,
in Brandel, the grower defendant was charged with continually vio-
lating the FLSA's child labor provisions over a period of years. 16 The
court of appeals upheld a lower court ruling that migrant pickle har-
vesters were not the grower's employees and, thus, were not covered
by the Act.1 The court weighed the various elements of the six-part
test and found an independent contractor relationship despite the fact
that Brandel had invested between $62,000 and $72,000 in the op-
eration,' 65 whereas the farmworkers only invested in their pails and
gloves.1 6 Furthermore, Brandel supplied and controlled all irrigation,
and determined pesticide use.167 The court also found that, unlike a
person running a true independent business operation, the workers
were not exposed to any actual risk of loss.16s And, though the court
noted that the harvesters earned the equivalent of $6.00 to $9.00 per
hour,169 it did not indicate how child labor figured into these estimated
earnings, or whether the additional labor of their children was taken
into consideration in calculating the harvesters' hourly wage. Not-
withstanding the. fact that the parents involved had no real investment
in or control over the harvest operation, the Brandel court held them
not to be employees and, thus, beyond the reach of the FLSA1 70 Sim-
ilarly, under Brandel, migrant child laborers in a typical sharefarming
arrangement are not considered the grower's employees, leaving such
children unprotected by the FLSA and growers free from any liability
for conditions of oppressive child labor.' 7'
Decisions like Brandel characterize the migrant worker as an in-
dependent business person, free to choose the terms and the grower
with whom he will work. This characterization, however, does not
reflect the economic realities of the relationship between the grower
and the migrant worker. As Linder states, "no valid socio-economic
or legal reason can be adduced for classifying cotton-hoers as self-em-
ployed business people. If such profoundly dependent workers (in-
162. See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
163. Donovan v. Brandel, 736 F.2d 1114, 1115 (6th Cir. 1984).
164. Id. at 1120.
165. Id. at 1118 n.8.
166. Id. at 1118.
167. Id. at 1116.
168. Id. at 1119.
169. Id. at 1120 n.10.
170. Id. at 1118-20.
171. See id. at 1120.
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cluding seven-year-old children) are independent contractors, the
category 'employees' is a null-set." 17 2 In addition, Linder aptly de-
scribes the almost total lack of bargaining power of the migrant farm-
worker in west Texas and the grower's power to exploit the workers,
given the competition among migrant workers:
Where the entire structure of the agricultural industry and the tone
of its industrial relations are based on the availability of a vast res-
ervoir of impoverished, unskilled workers with no alternative to com-
peting with one another for the same kind of work at the same wage,
the commands issued by agricultural employers assume a particularly
authoritative character. In parts of west Texas, the going rate for
cotton hoeing is $2.50 per hour, eighty-five cents per hour below the
federally mandated level. Of the large families of Mexican-American
migrant farmworkers who travel to these areas each summer, many
must rely on their earnings during this short season for the bulk of
their annual income. Competing in a labor market composed in large
degree of children and illegal aliens "willing" to work for even less
than $2.50 per hour, these workers cannot bargain over, let alone
reject, this coercive wage offer. 173
As in the Borello case, growers argue that workers seek out and
prefer sharefarming arrangements because as "independent business
persons," rather than mere employees, they make more money. 74 Al-
though the family may in fact make more money, it is because these
arrangements allow parents and growers to exploit the labor of chil-
dren without complying with the Act's prohibitions against oppressive
child labor. In the Borello case, for example, the court found that a
sharefarmer's weekly earnings ranged from a high of $634.34 to a low
of $136.04.17 The court, however, also noted that:
Richard Borello acknowledged that these amounts must be split among
all the members of the sharefarmer's family who are working in his
plot, sometimes as many as eight or nine people-"[h]owever large
the family is." This may produce an effective hourly rate far below
that which each worker would presumably have received as an em-
ployee. 176
Characterizing these workers as independent contractors running in-
dependent business operations belies the reality of worker exploitation
behind such arrangements.
Because of the farmworkers' economic dependence, it is the
grower, not the farmworker, who is in a position to eradicate the con-
tinning conditions of child oppression in agricultural labor. Many mi-
172. Linder, supra note 74, at 438 n.15.
173. Id. at 466 (example taken from the author's legal practice).
174. S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep't of Indus. Relations, 48 Cal. 3d 341, 359 n.15,
769 P.2d 399, 410 n.15, 256 Cal. Rptr. 543, 554 n.15 (1989).
175. Id.
176. Id. (emphasis in original).
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grant workers actually need their children to work; they see no other
option to ensure their family's survival but to get as many family mem-
bers as possible to work in the fields.177 The parents' desire to have
their children work alongside them in the fields stems from brutal need,
not a reasoned decision about what is best for the child's development.
One government study summed up the reason for oppressive labor
among migrant children:
Child labor has all but disappeared from American industry. Only
in agriculture does it remain a serious problem. Children work in
agriculture today primarily for the same reason they formerly worked
in industry-because of poverty in the family. The child's earnings
are needed. This is the same reason given years ago why child labor
could not be eliminated in industry. 78
The growers, on the other hand, have the power to eradicate this prob-
lem by classifying each worker-child or adult-as an employee and
paying them the federally mandated minimum wage. Even if this cre-
ates a hardship on the growers and, ultimately, increased prices passed
on to the consumer, 179 it is a reasonable price to pay for the abolition
of oppressive labor practices, especially oppressive child labor.
In 1942, one commentator noted the fundamental evils of child
agricultural labor:
Due to the absence of labor standards, many of our farms are noth-
ing but sweatshops .... Few states even make a pretense of reg-
ulating the hours of employment for... children in agriculture. Farm
labor should no longer be idealized .... There is no reason to be
sentimental about farmers. We are, as E. C. Lindeman pointed out
years ago, a resourceless people if we must rely upon the unpaid labor
of women and children to save farming from bankruptcy.8 0
A system which has codified labor standards, but still allows children
to fall through the cracks under a legal fiction, works the same evils
as the system of sweatshop labor that flourished before the enactment
of the FLSA. Surely, this inconsistency cannot be what Congress in-
tended.
More than twenty-five years ago, Senator Javits of New York and
Senator Williams of New Jersey argued for reforms in FLSA legis-
lation regarding child agricultural laborers:
177. McConahay, supra note 22, at col. 4; see also R. TAYLOR, supra note 155, at 21.
178. U.S. Comm'N ON Cva RiOmHs, RocKY MouNrTm REGIONAL OFFICE, PEOPLE WHO
FoLLow THE CROPs 35 (1978).
179. The legislative history examining the relation of the cost of field labor to the price
of farm products to the consumer, indicates that remedial legislation would have only a minor
effect on consumer prices. "The conclusion is clear. Field labor is a very small percentage of
costs to the consumer." S. REP. No. 1487, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 20, reprinted in 1966 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADmmN. NEws 3002, 3022.
180. C. McWiuAw, ILL FARES THE LAND: M GRA"s AND MIORATORY LABOR IN THE
UNr'ED STATES 357 (1942).
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[W]hat we condemned with indignation over a generation ago in the
textile mills and industrial plants of this Nation we continue to accept
in an often equally oppressive form-agricultural child labor. There
are the same long hours, the same negligible pay, the same back-
breaking work, the same exposure to the elements, the lack of ed-
ucational opportunity despite the nominal restrictions on working
"during school hours"-all the same practices which deprive the child
of a real childhood .... 8
Considering Congress' remedial purposes in enacting the Fair Labor
Standards Act, it is absurd for courts to exempt migrant children,
perhaps the most vulnerable segment of our society, from the pro-
tections of this detailed legislation designed to safeguard workers from
deleterious labor practices. There can be no justification for allowing
industrialized growers to exploit children through a loophole in the
law and escape liability under the FLSA's child labor provisions. "The
law of independent contractors has an important place in the law, but
surely it was never intended to apply to humble employees of this sort,
so completely subject to the domination and control of the em-
ployer.' ' 182
Sharefarming agreements often force the whole family to pool
their earnings, with no single family member earning the minimum
wage. 83 A system dependent upon child labor decreases wages by forc-
ing adult workers to compete with cheap child labor. 18 Treating mi-
grant workers as employees, and thus ensuring that they receive at least
the minimum wage is essential to the abolition of oppressive child la-
bor. As noted by Cesar Chavez, sufficiently high adult rates of pay
will make the family work unit obsolete and migration unnecessary. 85
VI. Proposed Remedies to the Dilemma of Child Labor in
Agriculture
Child migrant workers historically have been denied the FLSA's
protections against oppressive child labor afforded children in other
labor markets. 18 6 In order to provide children working in agriculture
the same degree of protection afforded children in other industries and
181. S. REP. No. 1487, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 20, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADmN. NEWS 3002, 3039.
182. United States v. Vogue, Inc., 145 F.2d 609, 611 (4th Cir. 1944) (seamstresses making
alterations in ladies' retail garments without supervision).
183. See S.G. Borello & Sons v. Dep't of Indus. Relations, 48 Cal. 3d 341, 359 n.15, 769
P.2d 399, 410 n.15, 256 Cal. Rptr. 543, 554 n.15 (1989).
184. Linder, supra note 74, at 466.
185. R. SAWYER, supra note 72, at 105.
186. R. GOLDFARB, supra note 23, at 158-62.
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further the congressional goal behind the FLSA of protecting these
vulnerable workers from deleterious working conditions, several re-
forms are necessary. Needed reforms include an amendment to the
FLSA abolishing the family farm exemption, judicial recognition of
farmworkers as employees per se, and increased enforcement of the
child labor provisions of the FLSA.
A. FLSA Amendment Abolishing the "Family Farm" Exemption
An amendment abolishing the FLSA's "family farm" exemption
is urgently needed to protect the child agricultural worker. The jus-
tifications for treating children in agriculture differently than other
children and affording them less protection against oppressive labor
conditions are founded on an American myth, the falsity of which can
no longer be ignored.187 For too long, Americans have held the er-
roneous belief that agricultural work is salubrious, that it teaches vo-
cational skills, and that it somehow enhances child development. In
some instances, this assumption may be based on an individual's own
life experience, in which he performed some sort of agricultural labor
as a child and was unharmed.'88 In fact, agricultural labor is one of
the most dangerous of all occupations,'89 severely hindering many chil-
dren's growth and development and sometimes resulting in injury or
death. 9° Furthermore, an amendment abolishing the "family farm"
exemption would not proscribe all child farm labor. Such an amend-
ment would simply require that growers hiring child farmworkers com-
ply with the same FLSA child labor provisions that other employers
must comply with when hiring other types of child laborers.
B. Migrant Farmworkers as Employees Per Se
Another promising solution to the problem of oppressive child
agricultural labor would be categorical recognition, by both state and
187. See supra notes 33-46 and accompanying text.
188. The author's grandmother, Clara Lee Hensel, was unharmed as a child agricultural
worker in the early 1920s, despite the fact that, at age 14 she was dynamiting tree stumps
without supervision and alone. Indeed, she thought it was "great fun."
189. It has recently been observed that: "Farm work is enormously dangerous, due to both
the machinery used and the toxic pesticides and herbicides to which workers are exposed on
a daily basis. As a result, farmworkers suffer high rates of serious, occupation-related illness
and injury." Staff of the Migrant Legal Action Program, Migrant Law Developments, 23
CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 1202, 1203 (1990).
190. The Food and Drug Administration has estimated that there are as many as 1,000
deaths and 9,000 injuries among agricultural workers exposed to pesticides. Yet current law
allows 14-year-old children to work in the fields without restrictions. And with just a note
from their parents, 12- and 13-year-olds also can harvest crops alongside adults. Golodner,
The Children of Today's Sweatshops, 73 Bus. & Soc'Y REv. 51, 53 (1990).
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federal courts, of unskilled migrant farmworkers and migrant child
agricultural laborers as employees of agricultural businesses. This will
defeat attempts by growers to escape liability under the FLSA and will
accurately reflect the economic reality of the migrant worker.
The courts need not engage in a case-by-case inquiry to determine
whether unskilled migrant farm laborers are employees. A per se rule
making all migrant farmworkers employees under the FLSA would
send a clear message to growers that any subterfuges designed to avoid
FLSA provisions will not be tolerated. Judge Easterbrook has already
adopted this position, opining: "Migrant farm hands are 'employees'
under the FLSA-without regard to the crop and the contract in each
case. We can, and should, do away with ambulatory balancing in cases
of this sort. Once they know how the FLSA works, employers, work-
ers, and Congress have their options."' 91 A presumption that all mi-
grant workers are per se employees would eliminate growers' incentives
to circumvent regulation under the FLSA by labeling their workers
"independent contractors."
The Fair Labor Standards Act was enacted by Congress to protect
workers against deleterious working conditions.192 It was intended to
be construed broadly in the best interest of workers. 193 Migrant farm-
workers and especially their children are the type of workers Congress
intended to protect:
[T]he child we seek to protect is among the most oppressed and de-
prived of our citizens-the child of a Mexican-American family living
far below the poverty level, whose parents, for lack of a permanent
residence, cannot even vote and therefore exert no political influence,
whose parents have no legal right to collective bargaining. In sum,
this is a child who desperately needs to be brought in from the fields
and made a part of the society which the rest of our children take
for granted. 194
The creation of a per se rule that migrant farmworkers and child
laborers are employees and not independent contractors is necessary
because of the present lack of judicial guidance and the failure of
courts to implement Congress' intent. Under a per se rule, growers
would quickly realize that they had no hope in court. Consequently,
such a rule would deter growers from creating schemes to avoid com-
pliance with the FLSA, and would obviate the need for litigation.
191. Secretary of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1539 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook,
J., concurring).
192. Dunlop v. Carriage Carpet Co., 548 F.2d 139, 143 (6th Cir. 1977) (citing 29 U.S.C.
§202(a) (1988)).
193. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
194. S. REP. No. 1487, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 72, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. &
A9mw. NEws 3002, 3040 (supplemental views of Sen. Javits of New York and Sen. Williams
of New Jersey).
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C. Increased Enforcement and Penalties to Deter Child Labor Law
Violations
If migrant children are to be protected against oppressive agri-
cultural labor, the penalties for child labor violations must be made
tougher, and the investigation and prosecution of violations must be
pursued more zealously. A recent General Accounting Office study
showed a 250 percent increase in child labor law violations from 1983
to 1989.195 This figure appears to represent only the tip of the iceberg,
since the Labor Department's enforcement of the FLSA's child labor
provisions is badly underfunded and understaffed: "Fewer than 1,000
Labor Department compliance officers enforce all provisions of the
Fair Labor Standards Act, including wage and hour violations for
adult workers. Only 4 percent of the department's enforcement ac-
tivities are devoted to child labor, according to the General Accounting
Office."'16 This translates into a total of only about forty federal of-
ficers nationwide to investigate child labor abuses in all industries.
Current regulations set a maximum fine of $1,000 for violations
of the Act's child labor provisions.'9 Some violators view the current
low fines as just a cost of doing business.198 To deter such egregious
exploitation, Representatives Charles Schumer and Don J. Pease have
proposed: increased criminal penalties as high as $100,000; at least six
months in jail for recidivists; and civil penalties up to $10,000 for less
serious violations.19
One commentator urges that the general increase in child labor
violations is a crisis of extreme proportions in American society.2 ° She
supports the need for increased fines and in some cases jail sentences,
warning that without expedient action, "'turn of the century' child
labor exploitation will refer not only to 1900, but to 2000 as well. 20 1
195. Golodner, supra note 190, at 52.
196. Labor Secretary's Proposals Not Nearly Tough Enough, L.A. Daily J., Apr. 25, 1990,
at 6, col. 3 (statement of Rep. Don J. Pease).
197. 29 C.F.R. § 579.1(a) (1990).
198. Labor Secretary's Proposals Not Nearly Tough Enough, L.A. Daily J., Apr. 25, 1990,
at 6, col. 3. Linder notes the efforts of Colorado to crack down on employers who intentionally
mischaracterize their employees as independent contractors:
An interesting alternative approach is that taken by the Governor of Colorado in
his Executive Order of Apr. 30, 1987, requiring the attorney general to prosecute
and to bring civil claims against employers who knowingly mischaracterize their
employees as independent contractors and therefore cause a loss of revenues to the
State and a loss of benefits to employees.
Linder, supra note 74, at 472 n.162.
199. Linder, supra note 74, at 472 n.16.
200. Golodner, supra note 190, at 51-54.
201. Id. at 52.
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Conclusion
Because of widespread confusion over the classification of mi-
grant farmworkers as "employees" or "independent contractors" un-
der the Fair Labor Standards Act, children of migrant workers often
are left completely unprotected from oppressive conditions of child
labor. The growers, usually large agricultural corporations, seek to
classify migrant workers as independent contractors through share-
farming agreements, thus creating the fiction of an independent busi-
ness person running an independent farming operation. If the worker
is classified as an independent contractor, his children fall under the
"family farm" exemption. Under this exemption, a child agricultural
worker is completely unprotected by the FLSA provisions against op-
pressive child labor. The family farm exemption was passed over half
a century ago to allow children to help out in small, family-owned
and operated farms, but today this exemption is being misapplied to
migrant child laborers working for large-scale growers and agricultural
corporations.
Given these unique circumstances, courts should abolish the fam-
ily farm exemption and adopt a per se rule that migrant farmworkers
are employees under the FLSA. Furthermore, investigation and pros-
ecution of child labor violations must be zealously pursued, and in-
creased penalties must be imposed to deter further violations.
Migrant farmworkers have no political voice and little power to
organize for their own protection. Within this migrant community, the
child worker is perhaps the most vulnerable and exploited member.
A system that allows employers to exploit such a vulnerable segment
of society through clever schemes to avoid responsibly complying with
the FLSA's protective provisions is gravely defective. Legislative ab-
olition of the family farm exemption; unequivocal judicial pro-
nouncement of a presumption that migrant farmworkers are per se
employees; and strict prosecution of those who violate child labor
laws-these measures can and must be taken to eradicate oppressive
child labor once and for all. An agricultural process that continues
to rely on oppressive child labor fifty-three years after the enactment
of the Fair Labor Standards Act is truly a Harvest of Shame.
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